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EMPOWERING PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES:
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AS A PATHWAY TO
PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE
Francesco Seatzu1*

ABSTRACT—Recent years have witnessed a growing awareness of the
importance of the status of persons with disabilities as right-holders, and
increasing linkages being made between human rights and persons with
disabilities’ vulnerabilities in the development context. Stimulated by
mounting concerns about the impact of the financial crisis of 2007–2008 on
persons with disabilities, these changes have unsurprisingly catalyzed
attention on those rights of persons with disabilities that are most closely
connected to ensuring persons with disabilities’ development needs—
namely their social and economic rights. Focusing on the content of, and
duties imposed by, persons with disabilities’ socio-economic rights, this
article starts by describing the notions of “disability” and “disabled persons.”
It then discusses the emergence of persons with disabilities as socioeconomic rights holders, focusing on the question of whether persons with
disabilities are or should be considered a “special case” vis-à-vis such rights
when compared with other vulnerable groups. The article concludes with a
discussion of the role domestic courts can and should play in the enforcement
of the socio-economic rights contained in the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Persons with Disabilities.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This work looks at persons with disabilities and their social and
economic rights. It also discusses when and how competent national judicial
authorities may be called upon to implement such rights. With regard to this
latter issue, the focus will be on competent national judicial authorities of
developing countries. The focus on developing countries is for the simple
reason that the majority of the world’s disabled people—about 80 percent—
currently live in developing countries, as shown by some recent figures from
University College London.2 These issues are addressed in three stages.
First, the work describes the notions of social rights and disability
employed throughout it. In so doing, it pays special attention to the core
issues that arise in the conceptualization of persons with disabilities as socioeconomic rights holders. This demands a consideration of the implications
of different systems of disabilityhood and persons with disabilities from
societal, political, and normative perspectives. Moreover, it examines the
treatment of persons with disabilities under the United Nations (UN)
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)3 and its
related Optional Protocol.4 The CRPD, adopted in 2006 and signed or ratified
2
See Sophie Mitra et al., Disability and Poverty in Developing Countries: A Snapshot from the World
Health Survey, SOCIAL PROTECTION & LABOR THE WORLD BANK, Discussion Paper No. 1109, 1109
(Apr.
2011),
https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1566&context=gladnetcollect.
3
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
4
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2518
U.N.T.S. 283.

137

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

by 163 countries from all over the world,5 declares universal rights of every
person with a disability, including some social and economic rights for
disabled persons, such as the right to education, health, habilitation and
rehabilitation, work and employment, adequate living and protection.6
Secondly, the work discusses the special place occupied by persons
with disabilities with respect to socio-economic rights breaches and
considers whether persons with disabilities are or should be considered a
“special case” vis-à-vis such rights when compared with other vulnerable
groups. This is in parallel to a discussion of the alleged features and the
definition of socio-economic rights as “real” human rights with an aim to
reject objections against judicial implementation of such rights. It also
emphasizes and legitimizes the role of international human rights and public
international law.
Lastly, the work focuses on the role of domestic courts in the
enforcement of the socio-economic rights contained in the CRPD by
outlining the situations in which these courts could intervene and what action
they could adopt.
II. THE DEFINITIONS OF “PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES” AND
“DISABILITY”
The first step is to define the subjects of this work: that is, “persons with
disabilities.” Notwithstanding the efforts of the World Health Organization
(WHO),7 the specialized branch of the UN concerned with public health, the
meaning of “disability” and consequently that of “person with disability” still
varies significantly. In my view, this depends on the different ways of
“seeing” disability according to the social model of disability and according
to the medical model of disability. In a nutshell, “disability,” according to
the social model, is defined as a situation that derives from social constraints
and structures. This is in sharp contrast to how disability has been defined
by the supporters of the “medical model of disability”: namely, as a condition

5
For a chart of signatures and ratifications of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, see CRPD List of Countries by Signature : Confirmation: Accession : Ratification, DISABLED
WORLD (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.disabled-world.com/disability/discrimination/crpd-milestone.php.
6
See Francesco Seatzu, Social rights as persons with disabilities’ rights, RES. HANDBOOK INT’L L.
AND SOC. RTS., 224 (2020).
7
INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF FUNCTIONING, DISABILITY AND HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION
[WHO]
(2001),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/42407/9241545429.pdf;jsessionid=E775B4BADC286
D56EF10FFA94F6A1084?sequence=1. See also G. Stucki et al., Application of the International
Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) in clinical practice, 24 DISABILITY AND
REHAB. 281, 281–82 (2009).
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deriving from personal “deficiencies” to be solved by means of policies
directed at normalizing those who “suffer” them.8
While there are similarities between the definitions of disability in some
areas of social policy, legal disability definitions in each country—and often
in each legal instrument—differ with respect to non-discrimination and
employment measures, income maintenance, and social assistance with daily
life activities.9 Emblematic of this is the evolution of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),10 the “primary statutory vehicle for the
educational rights of persons with disabilities in the United States” according
to the U.S. National Council on Disability.11 Until October 2010, the term
“mental retardation”12 was preferred to that of “intellectual disability.”13
Perhaps even more emblematic is the evolution in the interpretation of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), which forbids
discrimination in federally funded activities and programs.14 As Paul
Longmore indicates, though the original aim of the Rehabilitation Act did
not intend to cover all forms of discrimination, the broad language of Section
504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act was eventually interpreted by the
implementing agency to ban all forms of discrimination in the public sector.15
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) also do not supply a workable definition
8
See Agustina Palacios, The Social Model in the International Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, 4 AGE HUM. RTS. J. 91, 91 (2015) (citing CRISTINA CHURRUCA MUGURUZA ET AL.,
VULNERABILITY AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (M. Carmen Barranco Avilés & Cristina Churruca
Muguruza eds., 2014)).
9
See Helen Bolderson & Deborah Mabbett, Non-Discriminating Social Policy? Policy scenarios for
meeting needs without categorisation, in WHAT FUTURE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY? DEBATES AND REFORMS
IN NATIONAL AND CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 53, 54 (Jochen Clasen ed., 2001).
10
20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1990).
11
See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, FINDING THE GAPS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
DISABILITY LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (CRPD) 90 (2008).
12
See, e.g., THE ICD-10 CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL AND BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS: CLINICAL
DESCRIPTIONS AND DIAGNOSTIC GUIDELINES 15 (1992) (recalling that the term “mental retardation” was
used in the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-IV (1994) and in the World Health Organization’s
ICD-10 (codes F70–F79)).
13
See Kevin Walker, Comparing American Disability Laws to the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities with Respect to Postsecondary Education for Persons with Intellectual
Disabilities, 12 NW. J INT’L HUM. RTS. 115, 117 n.16 (2014). See also Luis Salvador-Carulla, Marco
Bertelli, “Mental Retardation” or “Intellectual Disability”: Time for a Conceptual Change 41
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 10 (2008) (recalling that the term “mental retardation” was gradually changed after
2010 because of its negative and insulting connotation and offensiveness).
14
29 U.S.C. § 701 (1973) (amended 1998). For a commentary, see, e.g., Anne B. Thomas, Beyond
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 22 N.M. L. REV. 243
(1992).
15
See PAUL K. LONGMORE, WHY I BURNED MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY 104
(2003).
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of disability. Nevertheless, this has not hindered either of the two courts from
moving in the direction of developing their own case-law on disability issues.
To elucidate this point, the ECtHR has given a number of important
decisions that have had an impact on disability laws, policies and procedures,
notably in Bulgaria,16 France,17 Poland,18 the United Kingdom,19 the
Netherlands,20 and Italy.21 Similarly, one can also recall that the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IACcHR) and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) have also developed a rich case-law and
practice on the protection of the fundamental rights of persons with
disabilities,22 recently culminating in the IACcHR’s ruling on an emergency
“precautionary measures petition” filed by Disability Rights International
(DRI) on behalf of more than 300 children and adults at Federico Mora
Hospital in Guatemala.23 That being said, both courts have followed the
ECtHR’s lead in failing to clarify the operative meaning of the term
“disability.”24
But this is not all. One can also recall the MDAC v. Belgium case,25
where the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) found Belgium in
breach of the European Social Charter (ESC) for failing to provide education
and training for children with intellectual disabilities who are denied access
to mainstream education and to the forms of support necessary to ensure such
16

See generally Nencheva & Others v. Bulgaria, App. No. 48609/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-120956.
17
See generally Vincent v. France, App. No. 6253/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-77641.
18
See generally Zarzycki v. Poland, App. No. 15351/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-117210.
19
See generally Aswat v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 17299/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-118583.
20
See generally X & Y v. the Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1985),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57603.
21
See Francesco Seatzu, Does the European Convention on Human Rights Protect the Disabled?, 8
ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 397, 397–420 (2014).
22
See D. Guarnizo-Peralta, Disability rights in the Inter-American System of Human Rights, 36
NETH. Q. OF HUM. RTS. 43 (2018).
23
See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights orders Guatemala to protect children and
adults from abuses in psychiatric facility, DISABILITY RTS. INT’L. (Nov. 28, 2012),
https://www.driadvocacy.org/inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-orders-guatemala-toprotect-children-and-adults-from-abuses-in-psychiatric-facility/.
24
See Analía Banfi & Sofía Galvan, Los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad y la Comisión
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
(Nov.
10,
2014),
http://repositoriocdpd.net:8080/bitstream/handle/123456789/1303/Art_GalvanPuenteS_DerechosComis
ionInteramericana_2014.pdf?sequence=1.
25
See Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC) v. Belgium, Complaint No. 109/2014, Decision,
EUR. COMM’N OF SOC. RTS. (Oct. 16, 2017), http://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng?i=cc-109-2014dadmissandmerits-en.
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inclusion.26 But still, the issue of the definition of the term “disability” has
not been addressed as such by the ECSR. This is in spite of this Committee
monitoring an international legal instrument that, at Article 15, explicitly
refers to the right of persons with disabilities to independence, social
integration, and participation in the life of the community.27 Nevertheless,
given that supervisory body’s extensive reliance on the case-law of the
ECtHR in areas of overlap between the ECHR and ESC,28 should a question
of the definition of “disability” or of “persons with disabilities” arise before
it, the ECSR Committee would most likely enact a corresponding approach
to the expansive and inclusive one that has been implicitly adopted by the
ECtHR in its disability line of cases.29
In light of the preponderant approach of international and regional
human rights law, as well as the wide diversity of approaches at national
level, this work aligns itself with the broad notion of “disability” that is
implicitly encompassed in the CRPD through reference to the social model
understanding of disability—that is the belief that disability is a socially
constructed entity rather than a medicalized pathology.30 This is not to ignore
the fact that in some domestic legal systems the constitutional framework
leads to a much less inclusive definition.31 In particular, this occurs in those
legal systems that adopt, either explicitly or implicitly, the traditional
26

See Giuseppe Palmisano, Protecting the Rights of Persons with Autism: the Role of the European
Committee of Social Rights, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMANITY: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF FLAVIA LATTANZI 90, 90–104 (Pia Acconci et al. eds., 2017).
27
European Social Charter (revised) art. 15, May 3 1996, 163 E.T.S. (“With a view to ensuring . . .
the effective exercise of the right to independence, social integration and participation in the life of the
community, the Parties undertake . . . (1) to take necessary measures to provide persons with disabilities
with guidance, education and vocational training . . . (2) to promote their access to employment through
all measures tending to encourage employers to hire and keep in employment persons with
disabilities . . . .”).
28
See Dovilė Gailiūtė, Right to Housing in the Jurisprudence of the European Committee of Social
Rights, 4 SOCIETAL STUD. 1605 (2012). See also Francesco Seatzu, Enhancing a Principled Justificatory
Model of Adjudication for the Protection of Human Rights in the Socio-Economic Sphere—The Impact
of the European Social Charter on the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 15 GLOBAL
COMMUNITY Y.B. INT’L. L. AND JURISPRUDENCE 247 (2015).
29
See Emily Hazlett, Disability Rights in a Post-Convention Era: Protecting Legal Capacity at the
European Court and Beyond, 2 INT’L. HUM. RTS. INTERNSHIP WORKING PAPER SERIES 11 (2014).
30
On the social model understanding of disability, see, e.g., Mike Oliver, The Social Model in Action:
if I had a hammer, in IMPLEMENTING THE SOCIAL MODEL OF DISABILITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH
LEEDS 18 (Colin Barnes & Geof Mercer eds., 2004); Rannveig Traustadottir, Disability Studies, the Social
Model and Legal Developments, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES: EUROPEAN AND SCANDINAVIAN PERSPECTIVES 3 (Oddný Arnadóttir & Gerard Quinn eds.,
2009). For some recent criticisms of this model, see Janine Owens, Exploring the critiques of the social
model of disability: the transformative possibility of Arendt’s notion of power, 37 SOC. OF HEALTH &
ILLNESS 385 (2015).
31
See HEALTH CARE FOR PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
ACROSS THE LIFESPAN 418 (I. Leslie Rubin et al. eds., 2016).
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medical model understanding of disability, the central tenets of which are
that a person’s “impairment” can be diagnosed, cured, or at least
rehabilitated by medicine and/or medical technology and that such
interventions will be provided by all-knowing professionals.32
III. THE EMERGENCE OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES AS SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS HOLDERS
Having indicated who we are considering here, it is appropriate to
clarify why it is indispensable to take these people into consideration. It is
important that more observation be given to persons with disabilities as
socio-economic rights holders, autonomous from the community to which
they belong. Persons with disabilities are currently acknowledged as a
minority rights group.33 Indirectly, this is confirmed by the existence of an
ad hoc human rights treaty (the CRPD), and also by the shared experience
of discrimination, oppression and suffering that persons with disabilities
share with other minority groups in society like, and in particular with,
elderly people34 and children.35 Throughout the world, especially in
developing countries, disabled persons cannot exercise significant legal or
strategic economic influence and are generally, ultimately excluded from the
large majority of societal organizations, whether labor or political in nature.36
Conventionally, in regarding persons with disabilities—particularly persons
with intellectual disabilities—as a discrete category of individuals, Western
societies usually set them aside as incompetent individuals who are
“inferior” to non-disabled individuals and whose enjoyment of fundamental
freedoms and rights is conditioned upon the views of the state or legal
guardians, or both.37
32

See Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 221 (2000).
33
See Corey Leshandon Moore, The Minority Group Model and Persons With Disabilities: Toward
a More Progressive Disability Public Policy in the United States of America, 4 AUSTL. J. REHAB. COUNS.
36 (1998).
34
See, e.g, Mutamad Amin et al., EquiFrame: A framework for analysis of the inclusion of human
rights and vulnerable groups in health policies, 13 HEALTH AND HUM. RTS. J. 82 (2011).
35
On the classification of children as belonging to a minority group, see Daniel Thomas Cook,
Minority Group, Children as, in THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHILDREN AND CHILDHOOD STUDIES 1111
(Daniel Thomas Cook ed., 2020) (recalling that “children can be understood as a minority group in
different ways, including as the last minority—a social group that has not yet achieved equal rights.”).
36
See Joanne Neille & Claire Penn, Beyond Physical Access: a qualitative analysis into the barriers
to policy implementation and service provision experienced by persons with disabilities living in a rural
context, 15 RURAL AND REMOTE HEALTH (2015); Gobinda C. Pal, Disability, Intersectionality and
Deprivation: An Excluded Agenda, 23 PSYCHOL. & DEVELOPING SOC’T. 159 (2011).
37
See, e.g., Hélène Ouellette-Kuntz et al., Public Attitudes Towards Individuals with Intellectual
Disabilities as Measured by the Concept of Social Distance, 23 J. APPLIED RES. INTELL. DISABILITIES
134 (2010).
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Clearly, the considerations made above and below in this work about
persons with disabilities may be rejected as wide-ranging conjectures that
characterize persons with disabilities as an alike group whose views and
interests are similar and who are confronted with the same challenges. But,
of course, they are not. Similar to other social groups, persons with
disabilities differ from each other in terms of race, socioeconomic status, and
gender. Nevertheless, I would maintain that persons with disabilities are
similar enough in terms of common features—such as needs, lifestyle, and
legal and political status—for it to be admissible to refer to “persons with
disabilities” in building my line of reasoning.
The main reason there has been little consideration of persons with
disabilities as holders of social and economic rights is that, until recently,
disabled people were regarded as recipients of charitable acts and goodwill,
rather than as fundamental freedoms and rights-bearers themselves.38
Traditionally, persons with disabilities were not deemed to be independent
actors enhancing social processes. As a result, they did not achieve
consideration as a distinct group, justified by the perception that they are the
responsibility of their legal guardians. In fact, giving persons with disabilities
lifelong “dependent” status was functional to placing them outside the
socially active community.
The perception of persons with disabilities as rooted in a relationship
with a legal guardian that is able to meet their needs fails to take into account
the fact that the relationship between legal guardians and disabled persons
does not establish an identity of disabled persons interests. As several authors
have pointed out, a failure to consider the persons with disabilities’ claim to
resources as autonomous of the disabled-legal guardian relationship results
in a failure to recognize the position of persons with disabilities as separate
members of the social community with separate interests.39
Persons with disabilities’ social conditions are strongly connected with
those of the people who take care of them. Nevertheless, although resources
are often given to persons with (intellectual) disabilities by close relatives,40
this is not invariably the case. The idea that family relationships are
unavoidably supported by general principles of social justice misses the fact
38

See ARLENE S. KANTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISABILITY RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW:
30 (2015),
39
Neil H. Mickenberg, The Silent Clients: Legal and Ethical Considerations in Representing
Severely and Profoundly Retarded Individuals, 31 STAN. L. REV. 625, 630 (1979); Nina A. Kohn et al.,
Supported Decision Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship, 177 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1111, 1117
(2013).
40
See Brian Grossman & Sandy Magaña, Introduction to the special issue: Family Support of
Persons with Disabilities Across the Life Course, 19 JOURNAL OF FAMILY SOCIAL WORK 237, 239–41
(2007).
FROM CHARITY TO HUMAN RIGHTS
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that the family is not affected by the attitudes of society. Indeed, like any
other social entity, the family mirrors public assumptions that are still
disablist in nature. Moreover, the idea that persons with disabilities’ socioeconomic rights-related needs will be taken care of by their caregivers or
close relatives—compounded by the fact that the traditional predilection of
the state is to provide for persons with disabilities’ social entitlements
through the family unit—may disadvantage those persons with disabilities
who do not have family caregivers that are able to help. There has also been
a failure to adequately consider persons with disabilities’ needs when
examining the needs of “households” that leads to an undervaluation of the
needs of the disabled-members and to an excessive consideration of those
without disabilities, i.e. other members of the household.41
Essentially, the recurrent transfer of social rights-connected resources
from relatives to persons with disabilities neither abolishes nor invalidates
the duty of the state to persons with disabilities. In addition to its default task
of supplying social freedoms and rights where family caregivers have
difficulty to or are unable to do so, there are specific socio-economic rights—
such as the right to ensure maternity leave for working mothers, the right to
a healthy environment, and the right to social security—that only the state
can deliver. It is essential that persons with disabilities’ entitlements to
resources be considered as autonomous of the family caregiver-person.
There have been advancements in terms of attitudes and approaches to
persons with disabilities. Disabled persons, especially intellectually disabled
persons, are less frequently viewed as an extension of their relatives and legal
guardians, at least for States Parties to the CRPD, but as individuals with
their own fundamental freedoms and rights. Nevertheless, persons with
disabilities are still severely disadvantaged in society as compared to nondisabled persons. And this is so despite the entry into force of the CRPD that
has marked a “paradigm shift” in the rights of people with disabilities.42 This
point has been well captured by writers who claim that “disablism”—that is
the discriminatory, oppressive or abusive behavior of non-disabled toward
persons with disabilities—has the same negative impact on the lives of
41
See Alissa C. Stevens et al., Adults with One or More Functional Disabilities—United States,
2011–2014, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 1021, 1021 (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/pdfs/mm6538.pdf (also stressing that acknowledging the
characteristics of persons living with multiple disability types would be of strategic importance for
understanding the overall functional status of these individuals).
42
Ida E. Koch, From Invisibility to Indivisibility: The International Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, in THE UN CONVENTIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES:
EUROPEAN AND SCANDINAVIAN PERSPECTIVES 67, 67–77 (2009); Paul Harpur, Embracing the New
Disability Rights Paradigm: The Importance of the Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities,
27 DISABILITY & SOCIETY 1, 3–5 (2012); Teodor Mladenov, The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities and its Interpretation, 7 ALTE-EURO. J. DISABILITY 69, 72 (2013).
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persons with disabilities as the disability per se.43 Moreover, other authors,
in similar terms, maintain that disabilityhood as a social condition is still
defined within the social order as inferior to non-disabilityhood.44
Persons with disabilities have a different position in society from that
of other socially disadvantaged individuals. Ramon Puig and Stephen von
Tetzchner express this clearly by stressing the existence of a paradox
throughout history, according to which “the problem for people with
disabilities, unlike the problem for older persons and children (two other
groups of vulnerable subjects), has not been a lack of integration, but, rather,
an unfulfilled form of ‘integration,’ with limited possibilities for education,
work and social life.”45 On such a view of persons with disabilities, disabled
dependence must be approached and resolved through political or social
development. Puig and von Tetzchner’s claims deserve to be taken seriously.
Puig and von Tetzchner explain that the “dependence” of disabled persons is
to a large extent the result of cultural, social, and historical approaches
towards, and treatment of, persons with disabilities, rather than constituting
an unavoidable outcome of disabilityhood itself.46 Flawed perceptions of
disabled persons as non-autonomous and dependent have led to a vicious
cycle. Erroneous views on persons with disabilities are strengthened by the
restricted chances for persons with disabilities to prove their competence.
Strictly connected to this is the deleterious influence of the eugenic, an
ideology that was prevalent both in Western Europe and the United States in
the early twentieth century.47
Judicial consciousness of the weak and disadvantaged position of
persons with disabilities in the enjoyment of human rights, including socioeconomic rights, is clearly shown in ECtHR case-law. In Guberina v.
Croatia, the ECtHR observed that:
the alleged discriminatory treatment of the applicant on
account of the disability of his child, with whom he has close
personal links and for whom he provides care, is a form of

43
For further references on this point, see e.g., MICHAEL W.J. SCHILLMEIER, RETHINKING
DISABILITY: BODIES, SENSES AND THINGS 5 (2010); Shelly Tremain, On the Subject of Impairment, in
DISABILITY/POSTMODERNITY: EMBODYING DISABILITY THEORY 32 (Corker & Shakespeare eds., 2002).
44
See, e.g., Tom Shakespeare, Back to the future? New genetics and disabled people, 1 CRITICAL
SOC. POL’Y 20 (1995); Paul Abberley, The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social
Theory of Disability, 2 DISABILITY, HANDICAP & SOC’Y 5 (1987).
45
See Ramon Puig & Stephen von Tetzchner, The Disabled Person in Society: an Historical
Perspective in Issues, in TELECOMMUNICATION AND DISABILITY 623 (Tetzchner ed., 1991).
46
Id.
47
David Pfeiffer, Eugenics and Disability Discrimination, 9 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 481 (1994).
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disability-based discrimination covered by Article 14 of the
Convention.48
This statement reflects a perception of disability dependence as something
that shall not in any case be used to prevent the effective exercise of
fundamental rights including socio-economic rights, like the right to
housing. A similar line of reasoning is found in Enver Şahin v. Turkey.49
Here, the ECHR maintained that neither economic nor time constraints can
justify the refusal or delay of the State in introducing the necessary changes
to the environment that would permit any persons (including persons with
disabilities) to exercise their right to education.50
IV. SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AS “REAL” HUMAN RIGHTS
Before moving to discuss the legitimacy and efficacy of the domestic
courts’ enforcement of persons with disabilities’ socio-economic rights, it is
necessary to consider some of the objections that have been traditionally
posed to the competent national judicial authorities becoming involved in the
adjudication of socio-economic rights. Here, the focus will be on objections
related to the characteristics or nature of socio-economic rights that the large
majority of legal authors have for decades identified as incompatible with
their judicial implementation and constitutionalization. In enumerating these
objections, I will follow the structure for the judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights provided by Natasha G. Menell,51 as well as the discussion
contained in Jeff King’s book titled Judging Social Rights.52
First, according to the “democratic objection,” judicial implementation
of socio-economic rights restricts the scope of the democratic decisionmaking process.53 Supporting this conclusion is the idea that a single judicial
decision may oblige the political branches of government to treat an
individual beneficiary or class of beneficiaries differently, or eventually to
adjust democratically developed policies.54 For the supporters of this view,
the judicial implementation of socio-economic rights poses two structural
48

Guberina v. Croatia, App. No. 23682/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 28 (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-161530.
49
Sahin
v.
Turkey,
App.
No.
44774/98,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
115
(2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70956.
50
Id. at 36–37.
51
See Natasha G. Menell, Judicial Enforcement of Socioeconomic Rights: A Comparison between
Transformative Projects in India and South Africa, 49 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 723 (2016).
52
See JEFF KING, JUDGING SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012).
53
See Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, in
EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 21, 21–24, 35–38 (Daphne Barak-Erez
& Aeyal M. Gross eds., 2007).
54
See Natasha G. Menell, supra note 51, at 727.
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concerns. 55 The first concern is that of the separation of powers between the
democratic branches and the judicial branch, because it gives courts the
possibility to “invalidate choices as to the allocation of financial resources
that are fundamentally political.”56 Second, implementation of socioeconomic rights raises questions related to judicial capacity. And this is for
the very reason that judges are neither in theory nor in practice the bestplaced state entities to evaluate potential policy options and select between
priorities.”57
Unlike executive officers and legislators, competent domestic judicial
authorities arguably lack democratic accountability.58 Nevertheless, as
Michelman has rightly pointed out, this objection fails to consider that socioeconomic rights may also be formulated in a narrower form.59 States can draft
socio-economic rights as duties for the state to pursue progressive and
gradual realization, rather than as absolute individual rights, providing
greater policy flexibility.60
The second objection is generally known as the “contractarian
objection.”61 At the heart of this objection is the idea that enforcement of
socio-economic rights is not easy to measure, which allows the
circumventing of citizens’ abilities to evaluate adherence to the state’s
constitutional duties.62 The vagueness of the level of achievement of socioeconomic rights makes it hard for citizens to establish whether political
policy choices effectively breach or respect their rights.63 This might lead to
a perceived failure of democratic legitimacy because citizens are not
correctly informed on the performance of their political leaders.64 Michelman
suggests this objection, too, can be dismissed.65 Notwithstanding that
reasonable citizens can differ in their evaluations of the realization of a socioeconomic right, they can agree on a wide spectrum of acceptable procedures
and policy choices for assigning priorities.66 If reasonable citizens perceive
constitutional social rights as establishing bounds on the acceptable policy

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Natasha G. Menell, supra note 51, at 727.
See Michelman, supra note 53, at 32–33.
Id. at 32.
See MENELL, supra note 51, at 728.
Id. at 728.
Id.
Id..
See MICHELMAN, supra note 53, at 32.
Id. at 32–33.
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space, then they can relatively easily determine the extent to which national
legislators have kept within those boundaries.67
Another frequently made objection to courts adjudicating socioeconomic rights is that socio-economic rights radically differ from civil and
political rights given the former involves the expenditure of resources, while
the latter are without costs.68 But even this claim is far from being true for
various reasons. For instance, indicating which rights are social and which
ones are not, even assuming that such language can be used, is never as
simple as could be presumed.69 This is certainly true when analyzing socioeconomic rights and rights that are instrumental to promoting development.
There is a great deal of interdependence and overlap between civil and socioeconomic rights, on the one hand, and between socio-economic rights
amongst themselves on the other.70 For example, the right of all peoples to
self-determination that is encompassed both in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights71 and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,72 as well as the right of minorities to enjoy their
own culture in community with other members offer two vivid confirmations
of this interdependence and possible overlaps.73
V. THE SPECIAL CASE OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
While civil and political rights were, for a long time, marginal in the
discussion of disability rights, socio-economic rights were greatly debated
and perceived as being of critical importance by disability activists and
disability studies scholars, and this was so even during the early times of the

67
See Rehan Abeyratne, Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian Constitution: Toward a Broader
Conception of Legitimacy, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014).
68
See Cecile Fabre, Constitutionalising Social Rights, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 263 (1998); Aryeh Neier,
Social and Economic Rights: A Critique, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (2006); Katharine G. Young, The
Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content, 33 YALE INT’L L. J. 113
(2008).
69
See Virginia Mantouvalou, The Case for Social Rights, 6 GEO. L. FAC. PUBL’N & OTHER WORKS
10–18 (2010).
70
See Neil Hibbert, Human Rights and Social Justice, 6 LAWS (2017).
71
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S 3. (providing for the right of all peoples to self-determination).
72
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(providing for the right of all peoples to self-determination).
73
See Martin Scheinin, The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Theory to Practice, in SOCIAL
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 549
(Malcolm Langford ed., 2008) (“Article 27 on minority rights represents an explicit extension by the
ICCPR into the field of economic, social and cultural rights.”).
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various disability movements.74 The reason behind this focus on social rights
is the traditional conceptualization of disability rights in terms of social and
welfare rights, which was, incidentally, the only coherent element of the
initial paternalistic approach to disability.75 Having said that, there is no
question that social rights, such as those relating to adequate social
protection, work, education and livelihood, are of strategic importance for
articulating demands by and for disabled persons. The expansive language
of Article 24 of the CRPD76 which provides not only that children with
disabilities should not be discriminated against but also that they should be
able to participate in the general education system77 indirectly confirms this
conclusion in relation to the right to education.78
Although the nature of the socio-economic rights breaches experienced
by persons with disabilities and other socio-economically disadvantaged
groups can be analogous, it is of key relevance to stress that persons with
disabilities face different challenges in terms of the assertion of their socioeconomic rights than do several other vulnerable groups. It is not that persons
with disabilities are more fragile than all other social groups but only that
they are differently fragile.79 Persons with disabilities share several of the
problems faced by children, including traditional subjection to charity and
paternalistic measures. Unlike disadvantaged children and like women and
older persons however, they represent a cross-class minority of the
population. Persons with disabilities are not uniformly discriminated against.
Again, on paper at least, they may obtain more sympathy than other socially
vulnerable groups, like prisoners and irregular migrants who are often
rejected by more privileged segments of the society. If persons with
disabilities are more sympathetic figures than irregular migrants and
74

See Janet E. Lord & Michael A. Stein, The Domestic Incorporation of Human Rights Law and the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 83 WASH. L. REV. 449, 450, 460
(2008).
75
See Arlene Kanter, The Promise and Challenge of the United Nations Convention on the Right of
Persons with Disabilities, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 11 (2007).
76
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 24, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
77
See Gauthier de Beco, The Right to Inclusive Education According to Article 24 of the UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Background, Requirements and (Remaining)
Questions, 32 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 264 (2014).
78
See Dimitris Anastasiou et al., Article 24: Education, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 670 (Ilias Bantekas et al. eds., 2018) (stressing that “paragraph 1 of
Article 28 is appropriately (and even inspiringly) expansive in its vision of educational attainment for
PWD . . . .”).
79
See, Johan Lievens & Marie Spinoy, Dupin v. France: the ECtHR going old school in its appraisal
of
inclusive
education?,
STRASBOURG
OBSERVERS
(Feb.
11,
2019),
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2019/02/11/dupin-v-france-the-ecthr-going-old-school-in-its-appraisalof-inclusive-education/#more-4304 (stressing that “education for children with a disability concerns a
complex service to organize in a world of finite resources.”).
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prisoners, then there is arguably more likely to be a lobby group ready to ask
for measures aimed at vindicating their rights than would exist for prisoners
or irregular migrants. Moreover, while discrimination on the grounds of
imprisonment or on the basis of illegal immigration status is still generally
allowed, discrimination on the grounds of disability is always considered
unacceptable as indirectly confirmed by the adoption and enactment of the
CRPD,80 and of the Optional Protocol (OP) that allows for an individual
citizen of a ratifying country to make a direct complaint to the UN CRPD
Committee about his or her treatment/discrimination,81 and also by the
ECtHR’s case-law relating to persons with disabilities.82 In relation to the
latter, reference is made to the ECtHR’s judgment in Guberina,83 where the
Court clarified for the first time in its jurisprudence that Article 14 of the
ECHR covered discrimination by association, and that consequently, the
applicant could claim victim status based on the disability of his child, “with
whom he had close personal links and for whom he provided care.”84
There are also a number of other ways in which persons with disabilities
are in a significantly different position from non-disabled persons with
regard to their enjoyment of socio-economic rights. First, persons with
disabilities, especially persons with intellectual disabilities and psychosocial
disabilities, are often affected in a different way from non-disabled persons
by violations of a similar nature.85 The psychological and physical effects
that persons with intellectual disabilities experience as a result of breaches
of their socio-economic rights and freedoms will usually be greater than
those suffered by non-intellectually disabled persons due to their different
level of mental development.86 This is certainly true with regard to the direct
impact that breaches of the right to an adequate standard of living can have
on an intellectually disabled person’s psychological state.
80
See R. Lang, The United Nations Convention on the right and dignities for persons with disability:
A panacea for ending disability discrimination?, 3 ALTER 265 (2009).
81
See, e.g., Tina Stavrinaki, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 670 (Ilias
Bantekas et al. eds., 2018)
82
See, e.g., Francesco Seatzu, supra note 21.
83
Guberina v. Croatia, App. No. 23682/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 28 (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-161530.
84
Constantin Cojocariu, Guberina and Gherghina: the two sides of the Court’s disability
jurisprudence,
STRASBOURG
OBSERVERS
(May
17,
2016),
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2016/05/17/guberina-and-gherghina-the-two-sides-of-the-courtsdisability-jurisprudence/.
85
See Monika Domańska, People with Disabilities as a Vulnerable Group. The Concept of
Protection of the Rights of Vulnerable Groups, 23 BIAŁOSTOCKIE STUDIA PRAWNICZE 28, 29 (2018).
86
See How discrimination impacts on the health of people with disability, CRE-DH CTR. RES.
EXCELLENCE DISABILITY & HEALTH, https://credh.org.au/publications/fact-sheets/how-discriminationimpacts-on-the-health-of-people-with-disability/ (last visited May 18, 2020).
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Consider the right to work and employment. Persons with disabilities
are more acutely affected than non-disabled persons by breaches of their
right to work and employment.87 While there can be little uncertainty that the
breach of a non-disabled person’s right to work can impact negatively on
their lives in terms of, for instance, their capability to gain a living, it is
probable that the violation of a disabled person’s right to work and
employment will have more serious consequences. This disparity is in
consideration of the fact that the employment opportunities for persons with
disabilities are generally lower than those of non-disabled persons, as
indirectly confirmed by the available statistics that show that the labor force
inactivity rate of workers with disabilities tends to be much higher than that
of other workers.88 This is also indirectly evidenced by the fact (highlighted
by the current UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities) that persons with disabilities are disproportionately fragile to
the negative consequences of insecure living and working conditions.89
Moreover, persons with disabilities who belong to other vulnerable
groups are more exposed to breaches of their socio-economic rights and
freedoms than persons with disabilities who do not belong to such groups.90
All of this depends on their suffering from both the disadvantages and
fragilities of their condition as persons with disabilities and those deriving
from detention, non-citizenship, status as an indigenous person, gender, etc.
For example, it is more likely that women with disabilities will experience
socio-economic rights breaches more often than those living without—a fact
that derives from the particular exclusion experienced by such women.91 It
can be argued that persons with disabilities who suffer such multiple
disadvantages are the victims of various discriminations at once.
Finally, persons with disabilities are often potential victims of national
legislation and policies that are based on the assumption that persons with

87

Marco Fasciglione, Article 27 of the CRPD and the Right of Inclusive Employment of People with
Autism, in PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH AUTISM IN THE FIELDS OF EDUCATION AND
EMPLOYMENT 145 (Valentina D. Fina & Rachele Cera eds., 2015).
88
See ARTHUR O’REILLY, THE RIGHT TO DECENT WORK OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (2007),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/--publ/documents/publication/wcms_091349.pdf.
89
Catalina Devandas-Aguilar (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities), Rep.
of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, U.N. Doc. A/70/297, para. 52
(August 7, 2015).
90
See Neta Ziv, The Social Rights of People with Disabilities: Reconciling Care and Justice, in
EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 369 (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M.
Gross eds., 2007).
91
See Rangita de Silva de Alwis, Mining the Intersections: Advancing the Rights of Women and
Children with Disabilities Within an Interrelated Web of Human Rights, 18 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 293
(2009).
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disabilities are unable to exercise the same rights as non-disabled persons,
and, therefore, focus on rehabilitation and social security instead of fully
allocating rights.92 Breaches of the socio-economic rights of persons with
disabilities are generally the result of systemic discriminations and structural
inequalities.93 Far from being surprising, this is in reality quite natural,
considering that the effects of discrimination are most clearly felt in the
sphere of socio-economic rights, in the fields of, for instance, employment,
housing, transport, cultural life and access to public services.94
VI. THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS
This paragraph makes two considerations, the first one being that of the
acknowledged general “lack of effective national disability policies that are
needed to provide a foundation for CRPD implementation.”95 The second is
“the lack of political will among policymakers for full implementation of the
CRPD.”96 Against this backdrop, this section then proceeds to argue that
domestic courts may and should play a strategic role in the domestic
protection of the socio-economic rights of persons with disabilities. A large
part of the argument used here implicitly assumes (similar to the drafters of
the CRPD) that social rights are fully justiciable and immediately claimable
entitlements. Also, that the “direct protection of social rights as justiciable
entitlements offers the best opportunity to develop a jurisprudence that
engages seriously with the content of these rights and the nature and scope
of the obligations they impose.”97 In so arguing, I consider the circumstances
in which the domestic courts can be called upon to give effect to the socioeconomic rights of disabled persons. Nevertheless, before so proceeding,
two general assumptions underlying this consideration shall be pointed out.
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See Disabled Persons, ICELAND HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE, http://www.humanrights.is/en/humanrights-education-project/human-rights-concepts-ideas-and-fora/the-human-rights-protection-ofvulnerable-groups/disabled-persons (last visited Apr. 26, 2020).
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See Steven J. Hoffman et al., Is the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Impacting Mental Health Laws and Policies in High-Income Countries? A Case Study of Implementation
in Canada, BMC INT. HEALTH HUM. RTS. 1 (2016).
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See ICELAND HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE, supra note 92.
95
See Raymond Lang et al., Implementing the United Nations Convention on the rights of persons
with disabilities: principles, implications, practice and limitations, 5 EUR. J. DISABILITY RES. 207, 208
(2011).
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Id. at 210.
97
See NTANDOKAYISE NDHLOVU, PROTECTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN ZIMBABWE, 33
(2016).
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The first assumption is that acknowledging socio-economic rights as
fully justiciable human rights98 means that no difference exists between these
rights and other fully justiciable human rights.99 There are indeed some
differences among these categories of human rights, concerning in particular
their historical origins100 and the role domestic courts play in the enforcement
and implementation phase. Admittedly, this role is harder to play in the
enforcement of socio-economic rights. This is given that, unlike civil and
political rights, social and economic rights are “policy structuring devices
intended to inform the way a government goes about its business.”101 In fact,
from this it follows that the government may defend a particular policy
measure on the grounds of an approach that is different to that taken by the
competent court in the case. Therefore, owing both to this and the fact that
socio-economic rights are highly costly to enforce, it is safe to conclude that
social rights are fully—but differently— justiciable.
Secondly, it is assumed that, because the fulfillment of socio-economic
rights normally leads to an increase in the expense of public resources that
are scarce by definition, the protection of these rights by a domestic court
could produce a macroeconomic disequilibrium, in the sense that it can
detract public resources that were bound to satisfy other social or economic
rights, in which case the court might paradoxically become a factor leading
to the breach of fundamental socio-economic rights.102 That being said, this
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There are a number of sources that recognize approaches in favor of the justiciability of social
rights. See, e.g., ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AS HUMAN
RIGHTS, 113 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 2001); ROBERT ALEXY, TEORÍA DE LOS DERECHOS
FUNDAMENTALES (1997); VÍCTOR ABRAMOVICH & CHRISTIAN COURTIS, LOS DERECHOS DOCIALES
COMO DERECHOS DXIGIBLES (2nd ed. 2004). On the other hand, there are various critical and more
skeptical views on the subject as well. See, e.g., GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (2nd ed.
1991); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights 4 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984); F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation
and Liberty 57 PHIL. 274 (1973); Rodolfo Arango, Los derechos sociales fundamentales como derechos
subjetivos 8 PENSAMIENTO JURÍDICO 138 (1998). Finally, for a source against, see S. Kalmanovitz, Las
consecuencias económicas de los fallos de la Corte Constitucional, 3 ECONOMÍA COLOMBIANA 276
(1999).
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For example, there is a résumé of the differences between the enforcement of social rights and the
enforcement of civil and political rights. See, e.g., David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights
Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT. L. J. 190 (2012).
100
See Asbjørn Eide, Economic and Social Rights as Human Rights, in ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 113 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 2001) (stressing that: “the formulation
of economic and social rights in the Universal Declaration is significantly influenced by the experience
of industrialization in Western countries.”).
101
Danie Brand, The Proceduralisation of South-African Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, or
“What are Socio-Economic Rights For?”, in RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: IN A TRANSFORMATIVE
CONSTITUTION 54 (Henk Botha et al. eds., 2003); See also RORY O’CONNELL ET AL., APPLYING AN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK TO STATE BUDGET ALLOCATIONS 9 (2014).
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See Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, INT’L COMM’N
JURISTs 1, 6, 9, 25–26, 99 (2008), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a7840562.pdf.
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is certainly not to suggest that national courts’ decisions on socio-economic
rights generally have such a negative impact on the protection of other
fundamental rights. On the contrary, it is simply to say that a negative impact
could be a possible outcome. The Indian Supreme Court’s practice on the
implementation of socio-economic rights contains an indirect awareness of
this possibility.103 And in fact, although the Indian Constitution sets out
socio-economic rights in a section of the Constitution called “Directive
Principles of State Policy” that deals with rights not enforceable in courts,
the Indian Supreme Court has given indirect effect to the Directive Principles
by interpreting civil and political rights, such as the right to life, to mean the
right to an adequate quality of life, including adequate nutrition, clothing and
shelter.104
But, let me now move back to the possibilities for the domestic courts
to intervene on issues concerning alleged violations or non-implementation
of socio-economic rights. For the sake of the exposition, I will examine the
circumstances in which domestic courts are requested to secure disabled
persons’ socio-economic rights. First, is the Executive’s failure to respect
disabled persons’ socio-economic rights.105 Second, there is the Executive’s
failure to prevent hindrances of third parties in the enjoyment of disabled
persons’ socio-economic rights.106 Thirdly and lastly, there is the Executive’s
failure to adopt positive actions and steps to enhance disabled persons’ social
rights. These three events result in the courts’ operating in different manners
to secure disabled persons’ social rights. With all that said, it is important to
acknowledge that socio-economic rights breaches are often complex, not
least because of the difficulties associated with qualifying austerity measures
as infringements of these rights.107 This should be kept in mind when
examining the approaches of the courts considered in this work.
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See Surya Deva, Access to justice for socio-economic rights: lessons from the Indian Experience,
VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG (Sept. 15, 2017), https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/access-to-justice-for-socioeconomic-rights-lessons-from-the-indian-experience/.
104
For further references on this issue, see Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, Constitutional
Law and Policy Division, The Protection of Social and Economic Rights: A Comparative Study, STAFF
PAPER 11 (1991).
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See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 9: The Domestic Application
of the Covenant, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 (Dec. 3, 1998) (stressing that the means used to give
effect in national law to socio-economic rights should be appropriate in the sense of producing results
which are consistent with the full discharge of the State party’s duties). See also Janet E. Lord & Michael
A. Stein, The Domestic Incorporation of Human Rights Law and the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 83 WASH. L. REV. 449, 460 (2008).
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The role the court is requested to exercise when the Executive does not
respect disabled persons’ socio-economic rights is substantially undisputed,
given the fact that it mainly leads to a revision of the state’s conduct. In such
a circumstance, the court will be demanded to order a stop to the intrusion in
question: it will not usually be demanded to impose positive measures to be
adopted by the state in order to guarantee the discharge of the rights in
question. The second situation, namely the Executive’s failure to prevent
third party hindrances to the enjoyment of disabled persons’ socio-economic
rights, may require the courts to adopt positive steps to put an end to the
intrusion by third parties.108 It seems, however, that this may be difficult in
the case of the adjudication of persons with disabilities socioeconomic rights,
given the prominence attributed to civil and political rights and the minor
attention given to socio-economic rights in the framework of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990,109 where the anti-discrimination approach
formed the fulcrum around which disability rights protection has revolved.110
However, it would not be difficult in the normative framework of the CRPD,
since the CRPD devotes several clauses to the protection of socio-economic
rights such as Article 24 (right to Education),111 Article 25 (the right to
health)112 and Article 27 (the right to work and employment).113 Nevertheless,
these steps are purported to prevent intrusions in the enjoyment of a
fundamental right. Therefore, as with the first situation, the courts’ actions
may be considered as purported to restore the status quo ante.
A court adjudicating a state’s failure to respect and protect is likely to
prove less controversial than adjudicating the Executive’s failure to adopt
positive steps to enhance disabled persons’ socio-economic rights, which is
aimed at changing the status quo ante. And yet this is less controversial, at
least if one believes (as the majority of constitutional lawyers do) that courts
have a role to play in the enforcement of constitutional obligations.114
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See Amita Dhanda, The right to treatment of persons with psychosocial disabilities and the role
of the courts, 28 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 155, 155–56 (2005).
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42 U.S.C. § 12101.
110
See Justice Srem-Sai, The hugger-mugger of enforcing socio-economic rights in Ghana: A threat
to the rights of persons with disabilities, 3 AFR. DISABILITY RTS. Y.B. 135, 140 (2015) (stressing that:
“[t]his disregard for socio-economic rights emanates from the ideological arguments that socio-economic
rights are mere political statements which are not amenable to judicial enforcement; and that they could
only be guaranteed by national policy (rather than law) and achieved progressively when resources are
available.”).
111
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112
Id. art. 25.
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114
But see for some critical dissent, Adam. S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Courts’ Limited Ability to
Protect Constitutional Rights, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 293 (2018).
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Nevertheless, it is also clear that the strict linkage between the three
situations mentioned above implies that courts can have a certain degree of
flexibility in terms of how they decide to classify fundamental rights
breaches and state conduct that comes before them. A particularly instructive
example is offered by the approach of the Supreme Court of India in Ranjit
Rajak.115 This decision centered on the right of access to work and
employment of a man who was denied the right to apply for a probationary
post at the State Bank of India because of a renal transplant in 2004.116 The
right of access to work of persons with medical disabilities was initially
considered not to be covered under the prevailing disability law, the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities Act (PWD Act).117 Later, however, the Supreme
Court found that the right to earn a livelihood of disabled persons had to be
considered as part of the PWD Act because India had ratified the CRPD.118
The applicant brought an action seeking, essentially, to be allowed to apply
for a probationary post at the Bank on the basis that such denial would
deprive him of his right to life and work guaranteed by the national
constitution.119 This action was based on a threatened breach by a state organ,
namely the State Bank of India, of its duty to respect (that is, not to interfere
with) the medically disabled person’s enjoyment of his right to access to
public employment and posts.120 However, the Supreme Court’s judgment
focused extensively on the wider and more encompassing duty of the state
to take steps to enhance the medically disabled person’s right to work by
eradicating discriminatory practices.121 This decision shows courts’ ability to
approach breaches of disabled persons’ socio-economic rights from a variety
of angles where they are demanded to do so.
VII.

FINAL REMARKS

This work has demonstrated the emergence of persons with disabilities
as socio-economic rights holders as a result of the adoption, entry into force,
and the high number of ratifications of the CRPD. As the analysis above

115

Ranjit Kumar Rajak v. State Bank of India, 5 Bom. C.R., 227 (2009) [hereinafter Ranjt Kumar

Rajak].
116

Id. at 227.
The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, GAZETTE OF INDIA (Dec. 28, 2016),
http://www.tezu.ernet.in/PwD/RPWD-ACT-2016.pdf.
118
Ranjt Kumar Rajak, supra note 115, at 228.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
See Lisa Waddington & Anna Lawson, Interpreting the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities in Domestic Courts, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES IN PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF COURTS 470 (Lisa Waddington
& Anna Lawson eds., 2018).
117

156

18:136 (2020)

Empowering Persons with Disabilities

illustrates, the CRPD’s use of the social model of disability instead of the
medical model combined with its innovative use of non-discrimination,
equality and social participation provisions and mechanisms have introduced
new tools that move socio-economic rights closer to civil and political
rights.122
Yet, although the innovations within the implementation and
monitoring provisions are relevant to the fostering, realization, and
“justiciability” of the socio-economic rights of persons with disabilities, they
are not sufficient per se to achieve that end, (e.g. to transform the CRPD’s
text into an actual lever of change in the socio-economic rights field in
conformity with the intention of its drafters).123 According to this work, in
order to do this it is indispensable to develop a broad understanding among
persons with disabilities of the practical importance for them of the socioeconomic rights and freedoms guaranteed in the CRPD, such as the right to
work and the right to health care, as well as a large understanding of the fact
that achieving these rights shall become a prioritized goal of the disability
rights movements and care agencies.124 Moreover, it is also necessary to
develop and promote a more precise role for the domestic courts in relation
to the enforcement of disabled persons’ socio-economic rights. And this
could be done, for instance, by following the above-mentioned example of
the Supreme Court of India in the Ranjit Rajak case concerning the right to
work and employment of a person suffering a physical disability.125
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